This paper takes a general look at the practical requirements for securing electronic signatures in both the physical as well as the electronic domains. It suggests that, whilst digital signatures have an important role to play in ensuring the security within the electronic domain, consideration also needs to be given to security in the physical world. Also, it is suggested that security applied to electronic signatures should be cost effective with a balanced approach to all the risks.
Background
Ever since their discovery, public key techniques and digital signatures have been considered as one of the prime means of providing the electronic equivalent to a physical signature on a piece of paper. Early United States state legislation gave specific recognition to the use of digital signatures. In considering the security of an electronic signature in a holistic way, it is necessary to address a range of issues as identified below:
Authentication of the signatory
In order for an electronic signature to be shown to belong to a specific individual, it is necessary to authenticate the signatory. There are three aspects of a human that are commonly used for authentication: As an aside, the term 'viewed' can be taken as audible as well than a visible representation of a document. Where a viewer converts a document to spoken words, this may be considered as viewing the document in audible form. In such cases, it may be necessary to record that signed document was 'viewed' in audible form to avoid any ambiguity over what is being signed. Wherever possible, signed documents should avoid the inclusion of any scripts, and whenever signed documents are being viewed which contain scripts, the application should give the user a warning that, because of the use of scripts, it may not be guaranteed that the document is viewed as originally signed.
Finally, there needs to be some assurance that the software on the users personal computer is operating correctly and that there is no rogue or malicious software that affects the document display. This is discussed later in this paper.
Indication of intent
Whilst intent is not explicitly identified as a requirement in the EU Directive, unlike its US counterpart, if a signature is to be used to indicate agreement, there needs to be some control over the act of signature creation. This could be through the clicking of an 'I agree' button or some other user input into the application which applies the signature, or through the same means as used for authentication. When using a smart card and PIN, the entry of the PIN can be used to indicate intent. 
Integrity protection within the electronic environment

Viewing and validating
Any party relying on the document or providing adjudication on the validity of the document needs to have some assurance that the document being viewed is an authentic signed document. This requires assurance that:
There is some visible indication that the protection applied in the electronic domain confirms integrity and authenticity of the document after it has been signed.
There is some means of tracing back to some physical authentication of the signatory and the 'intent to sign' bound in some way to the electronic mechanism. For example, there is a digital certificate which links the public signing key to a person who purports to have sole control over the public key. However, again it should be recognised that this is not the only means of authenticating the signatory. An alternative approach would be to bind some means of authentication, a biometric information or one-time password, into the document.
The document is displayed to the relying party or adjudicator in a way that conveys the same information as shown to the signatory.
Personal computer security
Perhaps the greatest security vulnerability lies in the platform used by the signatory and the party 
One-time passwords
One-time passwords, as the name implies, can only be used once. For example, they can be 
Third party digital signing services
Devices that apply signatures on behalf of users can be a cost effective way of ensuring that data is protected whilst in the electronic domain. A range of such devices exists, including time-stamping servers, digital notaries, and electronic seals. Whilst they do not directly authenticate the source, they can be used to bind authentication data (such as one-time passwords) to the document, and in some cases provide indirect authentication.
Signature gateway
A signature gateway provides a conduit between special purpose forms of signature (for instance, based on biometrics) to more widely recognised form of signature. For example, such a gateway may take a biometric signature applied locally, and counter-sign the document on behalf of the original signatory, using a standard form of digital signature. 
Conclusions
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